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ABSTRACT 
China and Vietnam have recently stepped up cooperation in cross-border 
infrastructure development in both overland and electric power sectors.  While this 
development is done in the name of “economic development,” these projects may have 
unintended consequences.  Using Albert Hirschman’s theory of trade as national power, 
this thesis argues that the cross-border infrastructure development provides China two 
mechanisms to apply the influence effect of trade on Vietnam.  Both sectors of cross-
border infrastructure development are analyzed in national, regional and bilateral 
contexts.  The results of this analysis demonstrate that China may not be intentionally 
creating the mechanisms to use the influence effect of trade.  Regardless of the intentions, 
these mechanisms are being created.  China could, in the future, use Hirschman’s 
influence effect of trade to modify Vietnamese behavior.  These mechanisms could be 
used in the event of a territorial dispute in the South China Sea or in the broader 
geopolitical affairs of the region.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis will contribute to the on-going debate over whether China’s rise as a 
regional and potential global power will be benign or disruptive for Southeast Asia.  The 
central argument is that China is creating mechanisms that can exert influence on 
Vietnam by developing infrastructure links and creating regional economic dependencies.  
These mechanisms are being formed as a consequence of economic development 
programs associated with bilateral and regional initiatives.  These infrastructure 
developments create the mechanisms for future exploitation by expanding China’s 
economic and military power projection capabilities.   
This thesis will argue that the newly developed, cross-border infrastructure links 
can used to exert Chinese influence over Vietnam in the event of a regional contingency 
involving territorial disputes in the South China Sea or broader geopolitical affairs in the 
region.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As China rises in power, a major debate has ensued concerning China’s role in the 
international community.  One school of thought is that China will have a “peaceful rise,” 
where it stresses the opportunities of a being a new global power and does not see a 
powerful China as a threat to the existing international system.1 Another school of 
thought is wary of the Chinese rise, warning that China will seek to be a disruptive 
                                                 
1 Zheng Bijian, "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (Sep/Oct, 
2005), 18.; Michael Yahuda, "The Evolving Asian Order: The Accommodation of Rising Chinese Power" 
in Power Shift : China and Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David L. Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), 347–361. 
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power, and seek to change the existing world order to its benefit.2 This debate is not just 
academic, as it influences the formulation of China policy in governments around the 
world.  This debate has particular impact on the United States, as it wrestles with the 
notion of a rise of another potential superpower, with U.S. leadership debating on treating 
China as a “strategic partner” or “strategic competitor.”3 
The debate is no less heated in Southeast Asia.  The ten nations of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) purse a mix of balancing, bandwagoning and 
hedging in both bilateral relations with China and in their various multilateral fora.4 
China is keenly aware of both the fears of its southern neighbors, and has pursed what 
some have called a “charm offensive” in the region.  A key aspect of this policy has been 
stressing “win-win” situations, such as economic cooperation and development, while 
putting contentious issues, like territorial disputes in the South China Sea on the 
backburner.5 
                                                 
2 David Shambaugh, "Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia's New Dynamics" in Power Shift : 
China and Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David L. Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), 1–22.  For analysis see Denny Roy, "Rising China and U.S. Interests: Inevitable Vs. Contingent 
Hazards," Orbis 47, no. 1 (Winter 2003, 2003), 125–137.  More recently Jonathan D. Pollack, "The 
Transformation of the Asian Security Order: Assessing China's Impact" in Power Shift : China and Asia's 
New Dynamics, ed. David L. Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 329–346. 
3 For representative articles see Robert Sutter, "China's Regional Strategy and Why it may Not be 
Good for America" in Power Shift : China and Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 289–305.; David M. Lampton, "China's Rise in Asia Need Not be at 
America's Expense" in Power Shift : China and Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 306–326. 
4 For an ASEAN perspective see Denny Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing Or 
Bandwagoning?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (Aug, 2005), 305–322. For analysis of China’s 
actions see Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, 
and Aspiration," Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (April, 2005), 102–122. 
5 Ralf Emmers, Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo, Vol. 
87 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005), 16, 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP87.pdf (accessed May 20, 2009).; Jing-dong Yuan, 
China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects, and Implications for U.S. Interests (Carlise, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 83, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB735.pdf (accessed May 20, 2009). 
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Relations, however, have not always been so cordial between China and one of its 
key southern neighbors, Vietnam.6 While having a relationship described as “lips and 
teeth” during Vietnam’s war with the United States, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship 
soured in the following years.  The relationship turned openly hostile when Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia in 1978.7 In early 1979, China sought to “teach a lesson” to Vietnam 
by invading its northern provinces.  While the invasion had limited objectives and lasted 
a short time, the lingering hostility lasted well into the next decade, with China having a 
policy to “bleed Vietnam white.”  Sino-Vietnamese relations started to thaw in 1989, 
when Vietnam announced that it would withdraw from Cambodia.  Over the next three 
years there were significant developments in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, as well as 
in the broader Communist world, that would lead to the normalization of relations in 
1991.   
Sino-Vietnamese relations continued to improve though the 1990’s, in the context 
of greater regional integration and cooperation.  When Vietnam was integrated into 
ASEAN in 1995, it was seen as a major turning point for the region.  Vietnam was no 
longer viewed as a threat by its neighbors, as demonstrated by former Thai Prime Minster 
Chatichai Choonhavan’s policy of “turning battlefields into marketplaces.”8 At first, 
China was reluctant to engage multilateral organizations.  China, however, came to view 
ASEAN and other multilateral fora, such as the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
                                                 
6 Ramses Amer, "Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Past, Present and Future" in Vietnamese Foreign Policy 
in Transition, eds. Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 68–129.; 
Ramses Amer, "Assessing Sino-Vietnamese Relations through the Management of Contentious Issues," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (August, 2004), 320–345. 
7 Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy : The War After the War, 1st ed. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1985), 479.; Robert S. Ross, The Indochina Tangle : China's Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 361. 
8 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnamese Foreign Policy: Multilateralism and the Threat of Peaceful 
Evolution" in Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition, eds. Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 1–24.; David Wurfel, "Between China and ASEAN: The Dialectics of 
Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy" in Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition, eds. Carlyle A. Thayer 
and Ramses Amer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 148–169. 
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grouping,9 as key actors in Chinese policy toward Southeast Asia.10 Thus, the Sino-
Vietnamese relationship took on an added dimension through regional multilateral 
organizations.11 There is debate in the literature on the vector of Vietnam’s policies 
toward China, focusing on if Vietnam is balancing, bandwagoning or hedging against 
their northern neighbor.12 
In recent years, economic development has been a major theme into Sino-
Vietnamese relations.  China has concentrated on economic development since the 
groundbreaking market reforms enacted in 1978.  Vietnam enacted similar “doi moi” 
reforms, in response to their economic crisis in 1986.  Since their respective reforms, 
both countries have increasing relied on economic development as a source of legitimacy 
for government of, by and for the Party.  Both China and Vietnam view stable relations as 
a key prerequisite for sustained economic growth.  Good relations mean good business 
and continued economic development.  Both the Communist Parties of China and 
Vietnam promote economic development as a way to maintain legitimacy and continued 
rule by the Party. 
In this atmosphere, Sino-Vietnamese economic relations have blossomed.  Cross-
border trade has outpaced expectations, and a regional free-trade agreement is becoming 
                                                 
9 The Greater Mekong Subregion includes Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and two 
provinces from China.  Yunnan province was an original member, while a second Chinese province, 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, was added in 2004.  While the only 2 Chinese provinces are 
members, Beijing is in charge of China’s action.  For further discussion see Thomas Chang, China's 
Participation in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS): A Review and Analysis of Chinese News Media 
(Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 
http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/?SN=SE20060518998 (accessed May 20, 2009). 
10 Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 
(Nov/Dec, 2003), 22–35.; David Shambaugh, "Return to the Middle Kingdom?: China and Asia in the 
Early Twenty-First Century" in Power Shift : China and Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David L. Shambaugh 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 23–47. 
11 Ramses Amer and Nguyen Hong Thao, "The Management of Vietnam's Border Disputes: What 
Impact on its Sovereignty and Regional Integration?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 3 (Dec, 2005), 
429–452.; Oliver Hensengerth, "Vietnam’s Security Objectives in Mekong Basin Governance" Journal of 
Vietnamese Studies 3, no. 2 (Summer 2008). 
12 Henry J. Kenny, Shadow of the Dragon : Vietnam's Continuing Struggle with China and its 
Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002), 177.; Jorn Dosch, 
"Vietnam's ASEAN Membership Revisited: Golden Opportunity Or Golden Cage?" Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 28, no. 2 (August, 2006), 234–258. 
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a reality.13 These interdependent relationships have been described as “win-win.”  Both 
China and Vietnam realize the need for increased cross-border infrastructure 
development to support further economic development.  These cross-border efforts are 
part of larger infrastructure development schemes by both countries14 and the region.15 
At the tenth China-ASEAN summit, China, Vietnam and the wider region 
identified infrastructure development as an important area of cooperation.16 The energy 
and transportation sectors are of particular interest.  Each of these sectors has extensive 
projects at the bilateral and regional levels.  Recent studies of cross-border infrastructure 
development indicate the positive effects of transportation infrastructure development on 
regional development.  Transportation initiatives include “hard” infrastructure 
development for roads and railroads, such as the Kunming-Singapore railway and road 
development in support of the GMS economic corridors.  “Soft” infrastructure initiatives 
provide transportation facilitation, such as streamlined border crossing procedures.  
Recent studies of the GMS trade patterns demonstrate positive effect of cross-border 
                                                 
13 For general economic background and the important role of cross-border links for Yunnan province 
see Ingrid d'Hooghe, "Regional Economic Integration in Yunnan" in China Deconstructs : Politics, Trade, 
and Regionalism, eds. David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London ; New York: Routledge, 1994), 
286–321.; Sandra Poncet, "Economic Integration of Yunnan with the Greater Mekong Subregion," Asian 
Economic Journal 20, no. 3 (Sep, 2006), 303–317.  Womack has written extensively on Sino-Vietnamese 
cross-border trade.  For a representative article see Brantly Womack, "China's Border Trade and its 
Relationship to the National Political Economy," American Asian Review 19, no. 2 (Summer, 2001), 31–48. 
14 China undertook the “Open Up the West” campaign in 2000, that places high priority on 
infrastructure development.  For more information see David S. G. Goodman, "The Campaign to "Open Up 
the West": National, Provincial-Level and Local Perspectives," The China Quarterly, no. 178 (Jun, 2004), 
317.; Hongyi Harry Lai, "China's Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and 
Prospects," Modern China 28, no. 4 (Oct., 2002), 432–466.  Vietnam sponsored various economic 
development programs since the doi moi reforms.  For an overview of these projects see World Bank, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, Vietnam Aiming High: 
Vietnam Development Report 2007 (Hanoi: World Bank,[2006]). 
15 Various organizations such as United Nations, APEC, ASEAN and the GMS have sponsored 
infrastructure development projects.  For instance, the UN has sponsored the Trans-Asian Highway and 
Trans-Asian Railway projects.  The ASEAN initiatives include Vietnam, but not the China, one example is 
the Trans-ASEAN power grid.   
16 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, "Chairman’s Statement of the Tenth ASEAN-China Summit" (Cebu, 
Philippines, ASEAN, January 14, 2007), 
http://www.12thaseansummit.org.ph/innertemplate3.asp?category=docs&docid=39 (accessed May 20, 
2009). 
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infrastructure development on trade and economic development.17 This effect has been 
applied to infrastructure in general and specifically to roads.18 This research also shows 
that increased domestic infrastructure can have a negative effect of cross-border trade, as 
it provides additional markets to the previously remote border provinces.  This may be a 
function of the gross underdevelopment of infrastructure in the border provinces.  As 
their integration into the domestic economy grows, they have less need for cross-border 
trade.19 The most important finding is that cross-border infrastructure has distinct effects 
from domestic infrastructure.   
The energy sector has many facets, but one area singled out for regional 
cooperation is electric power transmission.  The GMS has started towards developing an 
electricity market, and an interconnected transmission grid.  These infrastructure 
development and integration efforts are conducted under the banner of mutual benefit for 
economic cooperation and growth.  Two aspects of Chinese infrastructure development 
have been addressed in existing literature, expanding transportation links with Central 
and South Asia, and the impact of hydropower resource development in western China. 
There is a growing body of literature on the transportation infrastructure 
development in Central and South Asia in relation to China’s growing influence in the 
region.20 Garver focused on the identification of the mechanism to exert Chinese 
influence by the development of transportation infrastructure, not China’s underlying 
intentions.21 China is still far behind the Western powers in its ability to influence the 
region, especially in a post-9/11 world.  Since 9/11, the United States and North Atlantic 
                                                 
17 Manabu Fujimura and Christopher Edmonds, Impact of Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure on 
Trade and Investment in the Greater Mekong Subregion, Vol. 48 (Toyko: Asian Development Bank 
Institute, 2006), 35, http://www.adbi.org/files/2006.03.dp48.impact.crossborder.gms.pdf (accessed May 31, 
2009). 
18 Christopher Edmonds and Manabu Fujimura, Impact of Cross-Border Road Infrastructure on Trade 
and Investment in the Greater Mekong Subregion (Toyko: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2006), 17, 
http://www.adbi.org/files/cpp.road.infrastructure.paper.pdf (accessed May 31, 2009). 
19 Ibid., 11. 
20 For details see John W. Garver, "China's Influence in Central and South Asia: Is it Increasing?" in 
Power Shift : China and Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005), 205–227.  More recently, John W. Garver, "Development of China's Overland Transportation 
Links with Central, South-West and South Asia," The China Quarterly, no. 185 (March, 2006), 1–22. 
21 Ibid., 2. 
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Treaty Organization (NATO) countries have expanded their role in Central Asia with the 
Global War on Terrorism operations in Afghanistan.  China is not yet in a position to 
compete with this Western military presence in the region.  While China may not be the 
predominant actor in Central and South Asia, these projects represent efforts to expand its 
presence, and may impact Chinese relations with the other great powers in the region.  
While it includes Chinese projects in Burma, which is part of a GMS economic corridor, 
Garver’s analysis does not include other major Sino-Southeast Asian transportation 
infrastructure development projects. China’s infrastructure development projects in 
Southeast Asia, both bilateral and within the GMS and their geopolitical impact on the 
region remain under analyzed.   
Not all infrastructure development projects are considered to be “win-win” 
situations.  The development of hydropower resources on the Lancang River has been the 
topic of much debate and controversy, much of it surrounding the “non-traditional” 
security implications surrounding the environmental impact of changing the flow of the 
river and potential economic effect for the downstream riparian states.22 Liebman 
proposed that the Chinese exploitation of the Lancang may reveal Chinese intentions in 
the Southeast Asian region, based on a six criteria.23 The criteria focus on if the behavior 
is of significant importance, not a “win-win” situation and will cost China to cooperate.  
Other aspects include that China has preponderance of power in the situation, with the 
central government in Beijing in control of the decision making and if cooperation is 
irreversible.  Based on his analysis, Liebman asserts that China’s actions with regards to 
the Lancang development suggest China may not have a “peaceful rise” with regards to 
its Southeast Asian neighbors.  Liebman's analysis focused on the lack of Chinese 
cooperation with Southeast Asia on the use of the Mekong's water resources and does not 
address the economic effects of the Chinese-Vietnamese cross-border electricity trade, or 
the impact of the cross-border infrastructure development.   
                                                 
22 Evelyn Goh, China in the Mekong River Basin: The Regional Security Implications of Resource 
Development on the Lancang Jiang, Vol. 69 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2004), 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP69.PDF (accessed May 20, 2009).   
23 Alex Liebman, "Trickle-Down Hegemony? China's "Peaceful Rise" and Dam Building on the 
Mekong," Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (August 2005), 281–304. 
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The analysis surrounding China’s actions for developing the Lancang indicate that 
Beijing has been pursuing its own interests in developing electric power generation 
capability.24 Critics note that China has ignored the potential environmental impacts of 
developing the massive hydropower potential in western China, and Yunnan in particular. 
According to estimates, the exploitation of Yunnan’s hydropower potential has only 
begun, with less than half of the potential resources currently developed.25 Based on their 
behavior thus far, one cannot rule out Beijing using the electricity generated from these 
facilities as a form of economic leverage.   
China’s electric power sector has been studied in depth.  Much of the literature 
offers analysis of the “Open Up the West” campaign, and its impact on Yunnan and 
Guangxi provinces.26 Another area of study focuses on hydroelectric projects for the 
Mekong River, especially the Chinese Lancang projects.27 The literature stresses the 
environmental impacts and non-traditional security issues caused by upstream utilization 
of the river.  A final area of study is the structure of the Chinese electric power 
administration system and various restructuring and reorganizing efforts.28 The 
geopolitical impact of the GMS electric power grid and the Sino-Vietnamese cross-
border electrical trade has not been fully developed.   
                                                 
24 John Dore and Yu Xiaognag, Yunnan Hydropower Expansion, Chiang Mai University's Unit for 
Social & Environmental Research and Green Watershed, Kunming, PRC, 2004), 
http://internationalrivers.org/files/YunnanHydropower.pdf (accessed May 20, 2009). 
25 Ibid., 4. 
26 Darrin Magee, "Powershed Politics: Yunnan Hydropower Under Great Western Development," The 
China Quarterly, no. 185 (March, 2006), 23–41.; Tim Oakes, "Building a Southern Dynamo: Guizhou and 
State Power," The China Quarterly, no. 178 (June, 2004), 467–487. 
27 Lancang is the Chinese name for the upper reaches of the Mekong.  Goh, China in the Mekong 
River Basin: The Regional Security Implications of Resource Development on the Lancang Jiang, 17. 
28  C. P. Andrews-Speed, Energy Policy and Regulation in the People's Republic of China, Vol. 19 
(The Hague; New York: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 405.; Emily T. Yeh and Joanna I. Lewis, "State 
Power and the Logic of Reform in China's Electricity Sector," Pacific Affairs 77, no. 3 (Fall, 2004), 437–
465.; James H. Williams and Navroz K. Dubash, "Asian Electricity Reform in Historical Perspective," 
Pacific Affairs 77, no. 3 (Fall, 2004), 411–436. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
To demonstrate how infrastructure development creates a mechanism for Chinese 
influence in Vietnam, this study will attempt to apply Hirschman’s theory of national 
power through trade to the cross-border overland transportation links and electric power 
grid.  Hirschman’s approach allows for the influence effect of trade, stating that the more 
immediate effects of a stoppage of trade from China will have on the Vietnamese 
economy, the more influence Beijing will have in Hanoi.  Two case studies will be 
utilized, an analysis of the overland transportation links and the electric power grid.  The 
overland transportation links will be discussed in both bilateral and regional perspectives, 
focusing on the cross-border trade in goods.  The electric power grid will also be 
discussed in both bilateral and regional perspectives.  In each case, this study will argue 
that the interruption of trade will be more disruptive to Vietnam than China, thereby 
providing two distinct mechanisms for China to exert influence over Vietnam.   
This assessment of Sino-Vietnamese cross-border infrastructure development will 
utilize a variety of sources.  In addition to Hirschman’s theoretical work on national 
power, primary Chinese and Vietnamese policy statements documents from various 
international organizations, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.  
Secondary source will also be used, such as books, scholarly journal articles, academic 
publications, and news media reports relating to specific topics being discussed. 
D. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Hirschman’s concept of using foreign trade as an instrument of national power 
may be familiar to some readers.  Chapter II will provide a review of Hirschman’s major 
concepts of the supply effect and influence effect of foreign trade. The concept of 
unintended consequences as it relates to forming mechanisms for these two effects is also 
reviewed.   
Chapter III analyzes the first of two infrastructure development sectors, overland 
transportation.  This chapter discusses the road and rail cross border links.  It starts with a 
review of domestic transportation development within China and Vietnam.  It then 
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discusses the broader regional context by focusing on the Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS) economic corridors, and the transportation projects associated with this initiative.  
These projects include “hard infrastructure” projects including road and railway cross-
border links.  Then the “Two Corridors, One Economic Belt” initiative between China 
and Vietnam is discussed.  The next section addresses “soft infrastructure” initiatives for 
trade facilitation, focusing on the Sino-Vietnamese bilateral aspects of these projects.  
The chapter concludes with an analysis of how the new transportation links enable 
Beijing to employ aspects of Hirschman’s theory regarding the influence effect of trade.   
Chapter IV uses the same approach as the previous chapter, applied instead to the 
electric power sector.  The first section addresses national initiatives within China and 
Vietnam to address their generation, transmission and regulatory reform needs.  The 
second part of the chapter reviews the regional context by discussing APEC, ASEAN, 
and GMS regional initiatives in the power sector.  Next, Sino-Vietnamese bilateral 
projects are discussed.  The analysis focuses on projects that go beyond the scope of the 
regional initiatives.  The chapter concludes with an analysis of how the electric power 
trade between China and Vietnam, enabled by the infrastructure development and 
regulatory reform, fits Hirschman’s model of the influence effect of trade.    
Chapter V analyzes the implications of the infrastructure development and the 
formation of the mechanisms to expand Chinese influence in Vietnam.  Finally, 
implications for Vietnamese policy toward China, its neighbors are discussed.    
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II. TRADE AS NATIONAL POWER 
The Sino-Vietnamese relationship has been described as asymmetric.29 In this 
type of relationship, the larger power realizes the limitations of its own power, and 
acknowledges the lesser power’s right to exist.  The lesser power realizes its comparative 
weakness and pays “deference” to the greater power, while still maintaining autonomy.  
The lesser power will be influenced by the greater power.  While the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship has been analyzed in depth using this perspective, the exact mechanisms to 
exert influence are not fully developed.  China is said to be able to influence Vietnam 
because of the vast economic power.  But in what ways will China be able to specifically 
exert its economic influence in Vietnam?  A framework is needed to analyze how trade 
can be used as an instrument of national power. 
In his work, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Albert 
Hirschman outlines two aspects of using trade as an instrument of national power, the 
supply effect and the influence effect.30 The supply effect, which deals with the exchange 
of plentiful or less desired goods for more desired goods, is described as an “indirect 
instrument of power.”  On the other hand, the influence effect is described as a “direct 
source of power.”  The influence effect stems from two conditions.  The first condition is 
the dependency of one state on another state’s trade.   The second condition is the 
difficulty in adjusting the existing trade pattern from one state to another.  These two 
conditions can arise from a deliberate policy to create these dependencies by a state, or 
they can arise as unintended consequences of policies directed at other issues. Each of 
these is discussed in turn. 
                                                 
29  Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam : The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 281.  
30 Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, Expand ed., Vol. 1 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 172. 
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A. SUPPLY EFFECT 
The supply effect is the first aspect of trade that Hirschman identifies.  He 
describes this effect as a “positive” aspect of trade, as it provides a larger supply of “more 
wanted” goods and replaces “less wanted” goods. The “more wanted” goods will be ones 
that improve the war making capacity of the state.  Thus, supply effect emphasizes 
military benefits gained through trade.  Because the supply effect contributes to the war 
making capacities of the state, it can be considered an “indirect” source of power.31 As 
Hirschman explains,  
But, just as war or the threat of war can be considered in turn as a means 
of obtaining a certain result, so the supply effect of foreign trade is an 
indirect instrument of power, the direct instrument being war or the threat 
of war.32  
In the case of the supply effect, trade is subordinate to the overall military capability.  
The use of force or threat of force is the “direct source” of state power.  The supply effect 
could not be used on its own as a means of coercion without hurting the military capacity 
of the state by cutting off critical supplies of military goods. 
Hirschman maintains that the supply effect will be a motivating factor in a state’s 
behavior, since it is essential in order to maximize the military capacity of the state.  
First, states will attempt to secure the trade routes to ensure that the essential war making 
goods can be traded.  He sees sea lines of communication as particularly important.  A 
second behavior driven by the supply effect is that a state will stockpile essential goods.  
This can be seen with “strategic reserves” of essential goods such as oil and natural gas.  
A final behavior is that states will “redirect” trade to states where “the danger of being 
cut off is minimized.”  Alternate trading partners will be sought if there is a possibility of 
disruption of essential trade.  These three behaviors can be characterized as defensive in 
nature.  As Hirschman concludes, 
                                                 
31 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 14. 
32  Ibid., 14. 
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As far as the supply effect is concerned, foreign trade serves as a means of 
increasing efficiency of the military pressure which one country might 
bring to bear upon other countries.  But, just as war or the threat of war 
can be considered in turn a means of obtaining a certain result, so the 
supply effect of foreign trade is an indirect instrument of power, the direct 
instrument being war or the threat of war.  In its final result, therefore, the 
supply effect of foreign trade requires at least the possibility of war.33   
The threat of war or use of force may not always be the preferred method of obtaining a 
state’s goal.  This is where the second aspect of trade, the influence effect, becomes 
important. 
B. INFLUENCE EFFECT 
The second aspect of trade Hirschman identifies is the influence effect.  The 
influence effect can be divided into two categories of policy types.  First, there are 
policies that make it difficult for a state to “dispense entirely” with trade from a given 
state.  In this “ideal” situation, one state is without alternative trading partners.  This 
situation is akin to a colonizer-colony relationship, where one state has a monopoly on 
the other’s trade.  The second category is where a country makes it difficult for a trading 
partner to “shift” trade to another country.  This category involves situations where states 
have alternative trading partners and is widely applicable to current trading relationships. 
1. Difficulty in “Dispensing Entirely” with Trade 
The “ideal” situation is where Country B is dependent on its trade with Country 
A.  Country B cannot stop its trade with Country A.  Also, Country B cannot shift trade 
over to Country C or D.  Country A is free to trade with all, and is not dependent on any 
single country.  This situation represents an extreme example where on country does not 
have alternative trading partners, such as a colony.  Hirschman describes three categories 
of policies where country A can maximize the influence effect in the “ideal” case. 
Hirschman suggests three policies for this case.  First, increase the gain from trade and  
 
                                                 
33  Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 14. 
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create dependencies.  Second, make trade adjustment difficult for Country B.  Finally, 
Country A should foster interest groups in Country B with vested interest in maintaining 
the trade relationship.34 
The first policy category is to maximize the trading partner’s gain from the trade.  
This can be done in two ways. First, Country A can develop products where it has a 
“monopolistic position” and increase trade with these countries.  Second, it can “direct 
trade toward poorer countries.”  By directing trade to poorer countries, a country can 
generally receive as many goods as if it traded with rich countries, but the relative gain 
for the poorer countries would be more than for the rich ones.  This is due to the fact that 
poor countries start from a lower baseline than the rich ones, therefore, a small increase 
or decrease in trade will have greater impact on a poorer country relative to a rich 
country.  The immediate effects of a trade stoppage would be greater for the poor 
country. Country A maximizes it’s potential for influence by trading with the poorer 
countries because of the relative difference between rich and poor countries.   
The second policy category is to make it difficult for Country B to adjust its trade, 
if Country A decides to stop trade.  Hirschman notes that the interruption of trade is a 
constant threat between sovereign states.35 A stoppage of trade by Country A would have 
two effects on Country B.  First, it will “impoverish” Country B, as there is no longer a 
flow of goods.  Second, Country B will need a certain amount of time to switch 
production to products that it can consume in the domestic market, or export to other 
countries (not Country A).  After the adjustment period, the loss is not as great as when 
the stoppage first occurs.  So in order to maximize the influence effect of a trade 
stoppage, Country A will want to make the immediate effects of the trade stoppage as 
steep as possible for Country B. As Hirschman states,  
Given a certain ultimate loss, the influence which one country exercises 
upon another through foreign trade is therefore likely to be larger the 
greater the immediate loss which it can inflict by a stoppage of trade.36 
                                                 
34 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 28. 
35 Ibid., 26. 
36 Ibid., 27. 
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For Country A to maximize the immediate cost of a trade stoppage, it can follow 
two policies toward Country B.   First, it can trade with countries that have “little 
mobility of resources.”  These are states that are ones that usually suffer from geographic 
or labor limitations.37 The second policy is to encourage Country B to produce and export 
products for which they have a limited domestic demand.  The greater the percentage of 
exports that a country can absorb into the domestic market, the smaller the immediate 
effects from a trade stoppage.   
A third policy category makes it difficult to dispense entirely with trade by 
creating groups in Country B that have vested interests in maintaining trade ties with 
Country A.  A stoppage of trade will affect these groups especially hard, prompting them 
to mobilize in support of their interests.  Hirschman maintains that these groups, mainly 
businessmen, will pressure the Country B’s government to restore trade links, even by 
making concessions to Country A.38 
The “ideal” situation that allows for maximum influence from trade is the when 
Country B only exports to Country A, and cannot readily change production.  Country A 
should have a policy that maximizes the benefit for Country B to allow for the greater 
immediate effects from a trade stoppage.  Country A can also foster interests groups 
inside Country B with vested interest in continuing trade with Country A.   
2. Difficulty in “Shifting” Trade 
A second set of policy categories can be undertaken by a state to maximize the 
influence effect in a “non-ideal” situation, where Country B is able to trade with other 
countries.  In this more realistic case, Country A can still pursue policies to maximize the 
immediate effects of a trade stoppage.  The volume of trade is important in this scenario.  
The larger the portion of the total export market that is cut off by Country A, the harder it 
will be for Country B to recover from the stoppage by shifting its trade to Countries C 
and D.  For instance, Country B will be easily able to recover if only 5 percent of their 
                                                 
37 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 28. 
38 Ibid., 29. 
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export market is cut of, by shifting the exports to the remaining 95 percent of their 
market.  However, if the situation is reversed and 95 percent of the market cut off, 
Country B would be hard pressed to shift such a large percentage of trade to the 
remaining small share of the market left open to it.  Hirschman states,  
The greater the percentage of exports and imports involved in a dominant 
market, the more difficult it will be to provide substitute markets and 
sources of supply.39   
Given this situation, Hirschman argues that countries should try to foster trade with 
smaller countries.  This way Country A can maintain a large market share, in Country B, 
while Country B is only a small percentage of Country A’s total export market.40 
Hirschman relates this “elementary principle,” in order to maximize their power states 
should “direct its trade away from the large to the smaller trading states.”41 Likewise, 
smaller states should not let the larger states become too large a market for them, when 
there is “no reciprocal integration.”42 Thus, small countries can be defensive just as large 
ones can be offensive by using these principles. 
In this framework, there are a number of policies that Country A can use to 
manipulate Country B’s exports.  First, Country A may import products that do not have 
alternative markets in other countries.  These economies can be described as “exclusive 
complimentary.”43 Another way to manipulate exports is by purchasing products at 
above-market prices.  This can be done through currency manipulations in the exchange 
rate or by fostering high-cost production methods.  A final way to manipulate exports is 
to allow Country B special advantages in Country A’s market. 
                                                 
39 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 30. 
40 A monopoly for certain products would be a best case scenario.  This remains separate from the 
analysis in the “dispense entirely” section, as that scenario was a monopoly on all imports. 




Country A may also be able to manipulate Country B’s imports.  To accomplish 
this, Country A may manipulate Country B’s market by encouraging differences in 
“consumption and production habits.”44 As Hirschman notes, 
Hence, it is generally easier for an industrial country to change the source 
supply of its food stuffs and raw materials than it is for a country 
producing foodstuffs and raw materials to change its traditional supplier of 
industrial goods.45 
A final way to manipulate a country’s imports is to develop trade on a bilateral 
basis, creating “a technical impossibility of switching exports.”46 In this scenario, County 
B’s imports from Country A are needed to produce exports destined back to Country A.  
If this chain is broken, there can be devastating immediate effects for Country B, if 
carried out in conjunction with other policies.     
A fourth policy to make it difficult for a country to shift trade to another state is to 
develop “transit trade.”  This is where Country B’s trade to Country C must go though 
Country A. Transit trade is the best of both worlds, as it, creates a dependency on 
Country A by both Country B and C without much cost to Country A.  Transit trade is 
difficult to develop, as there are usually multiple ways of reaching a destination. 
When states can trade with multiple partners, the influence effect of trade can still 
be used.  Policies that aim to manipulate a given country’s imports and exports can be 
pursued.  If possible, transit trade can be fostered.    
C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
The aforementioned policies may be deliberately undertaken to maximize a state’s 
opportunity to use the influence effect of trade. Hirschman cautions against attributing 
the resulting effects directly to the policies that created them.  The strengthening of the 
influence effect of trade may be the unintended consequences of another policy.  It may 
be difficult for a state to solely to maximize the influence effect, as there competing 
                                                 
44 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 35. 
45 Ibid., 32. 
46 Ibid.  
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interests that must be satisfied with trade policy.  It is more likely that a policy will be 
followed if multiple goals can accomplished at once, with increasing the influence effect 
not being the primary goal.  Finally, a state may not be able to maximize the influence 
effect of trade with all of its trading partners at once, so it may need to be selective in 
application of policies.   
Hirschman’s work sets out a framework to analyze trade relations.  This 
framework outlines both the supply and influence effect of trade.  It outlines policies a 
country can use to maximize the amount of influence it has over a trading partner through 
the manipulation of foreign trade. The subsequent chapters will use this framework to 
analyze Sino-Vietnamese cross-border infrastructure development in the overland 
transportation and electric power sectors. 
D. ROLE OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Large scale cross-border infrastructure projects can be viewed as particularly 
important in Hirschman’s framework.  First, the fixed nature of the projects lends them to 
be aimed at trade with a specific country.  Cross-border railways and roads promote trade 
between specific countries.  For instance road development between Country A and 
Country B cannot be transferred to benefit Country C, unless transit trade can be 
developed.  Electric power transmission lines are also essentially bilateral, since they 
have limitations on the amount of electricity that can transmit.47 
Second, these projects require a large allocation of resources, generally with 
government involvement.  The commitment of large amounts of resources by a smaller, 
poorer country limits their ability to shift resources to away from a project.  Large 
infrastructure development projects are hard to back out of because of large “sunk costs,” 
which will be viewed as wasted resources and will incur political costs for the 
                                                 
47 Transmission lines can be connected to other countries through a grid, but if Country A is a key 
supplier of electricity to Countries B and C, the fact that Country B and C are connected makes little 
difference if they do not have enough indigenously produced electricity to meet their combined demand in 
case of a stoppage from Country A.  Even if Country A would only stop supply to Country B, but continue 
supply to Country C, Country B would be hard pressed to make up for the loss of Country A’s supply 
through Country C because of  physical limitations in the transmission lines. 
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government.  Because the amount of resources involved, infrastructure development will 
also signify that both Country A and B are committed to long term trade relationship. 
Third, infrastructure development enables and promotes existing forms of trade 
by promoting an expanded and more efficient logistics system.  The volume of traded 
goods cannot exceed the capacity of the logistics networks.  The overall volume that can 
be traded is increased by expanding the capacity of the logistics networks, which almost 
always requires infrastructure development.  A more efficient system will also increase 
the amount of goods that can be traded.  Markets may be expanded because of increased 
logistics efficiency.  For instance, fresh foodstuffs may have a limitation on how long 
they can be in transit.  By increasing the speed of the logistics network, the potential 
market can be increased without degrading the product.   
Finally, new forms of trade may be made possible by infrastructure development.  
Trade in electric power is only possible over transmission lines.  Without the prerequisite 
infrastructure this type of trade is not possible.   
Cross-border infrastructure development is important in Hirschman’s framework 
because it is an essential aspect of foreign trade.  Infrastructure development is an 
important factor to enable and expand foreign trade.  Thus, infrastructure development 
makes it possible for a country to use Hirschman’s supply and influence effect of trade.  
The economic benefits of expanding trade may be the primary reason for infrastructure 
development.  Hirschman’s supply and influence effect may be an unintended, but 
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III. LAND TRANSPORATION LINKS 
Road and rail infrastructure is an essential element for large scale trade.  Sino-
Vietnamese trade had been hampered by the lack of quality transportation links, and the 
frosty relations throughout the 1980s.  The 1979 border war had destroyed most of the 
infrastructure that was built in the previous years.  Both China and Vietnam had 
underdeveloped infrastructure in their respective border provinces.  The border provinces 
were not even connected to larger transportation networks within their own countries.  
Since normalization in 1991, both Beijing and Hanoi have begun to develop the cross-
border infrastructure.  While it took time for cross-border trade to significantly expand, 
but by 2006, China accounted for 8.6 percent of Vietnam’s exports and 8.8 percent of 
imports.48  Cross-border infrastructure is imperative for sustained trade and increased 
trade volumes between China and Vietnam.   
The development of Sino-Vietnamese cross-border transportation links must be 
viewed as part of larger programs at both the national and regional levels.  Both countries 
realize the importance of developing transportation infrastructure, and have dedicated 
significant resources to improving their transportation networks.  Beijing has stressed 
transportation infrastructure development throughout the country, with emphasis on the 
previously grossly underdeveloped western regions.49 The western region was targeted 
due to the gross underdevelopment in the transport sector.  This region includes both 
Yunnan Province and Guangxi Autonomous Region.  While initial state sponsored 
projects focused exclusively on domestic effects, more recent projects have also 
incorporated the regional benefits of projects.  This way, Beijing has tapped into 
additional financing mechanisms, such as the Asian Development Bank.   
                                                 
48 Stone, Susan and Anna Strutt. Transport Infrastructure and Trade Facilitation in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion. ADBI Working Paper 130. (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2009).   
49 Garver, Development of China's Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-West and South 
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Vietnam has also undergone similar national development of transportation 
links.50 Hanoi initially placed emphasis on connecting the national transportation systems 
between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, more recent projects have focused on two areas, 
poverty reduction and cross-border development.  Currently, the majority of projects 
associated with cross-border projects have been in conjunction with regional initiatives. 
Transportation infrastructure projects in the region involving China and Vietnam 
range from continental to sub-regional.  On the largest scale, the United Nations has 
sponsored the Trans-Asia Highway and Trans-Asia Railway projects, with a goal of 
connecting transportation links from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans.51  On a smaller 
scale, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) has sponsored infrastructure development 
through their “Economic Corridors Flagship Initiative,” with major funding from the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB).  Under this program, economic corridors, and 
corresponding transportation links, are planned between Vietnam and both Yunnan 
Province and Guangxi Autonomous Region in China.  This program has regional and 
bilateral aspects, with the formation of the “Two Corridors, One Economic Belt” 
initiative.  This scheme will correspond to the China-Vietnamese GMS economic 
corridor, but be more focused on developing bilateral trade.   
Road and railway development is important for Sino-Vietnamese trade relations.  
Cross-border trade has expanded rapidly, but needs to be supported by infrastructure 
development.    Under Hirschman’s framework, larger countries, such as China, should 
trade with smaller ones, such as Vietnam.  As the cross-border trade volume grows 
between China and Vietnam, Vietnam will have a larger percentage of its trade with 
China.  In this case, China can maintain a large market share in the Vietnamese market,  
 
                                                 
50 Le Ngoc Hoan, "Development Orientations of Vietnam Transport Branch in the Next Decades," 
http://www.mt.gov.vn (accessed March 22, 2007). 
51 The Trans-Asian Highway and Trans-Asian Railway are sponsored by the United Nations.  The 
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relative to the China’s total export market.  According to Hirschman, China should be 
able to influence Vietnam’s actions as Vietnam would incur economic difficulties if 
China were to stop trading. 
Rail and road development support Hirschman’s framework by both enabling 
trade and providing mechanisms to execute trade policy.  Most importantly, cross-border 
transportation infrastructure development allows trade to take place.  This serves both an 
enabling and multiplying effect for other policies directed at trade.  It also enables transit 
trade to be developed.  In Vietnam’s case, the developing markets in Central Asia may be 
only accessible via land transportation through China.  Infrastructure links also provide a 
mechanism to stop trade, which enables some of the trade policies in Hirschman’s 
framework.   
A. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION INITIATIVES 
The development of cross-border transportation infrastructure in China and 
Vietnam is best understood if placed in the context of the larger domestic transportation 
infrastructure development programs.  Both countries have undertaken massive 
investment in both road and railway infrastructure.  This domestic development is 
important as it connects the outlying provinces to the rest of the country and enables 
further trade by reducing transportation costs.   
Under Hirschman’s framework, connection of the outlying provinces to the larger 
domestic market allows the impact of a trade stoppage to be absorbed by the domestic 
market.  Also, it expands the potential market for imports or exports, and fosters trade by 
reducing trade costs.   
1. Chinese Domestic Initiatives 
The Chinese government has placed transportation infrastructure as a national 
priority for development.  There have been massive investments in both road and railway 
infrastructure at various times.  During the Third Front, priority was placed on railway 
development to the remote areas where heavy industry was being moved.  As the 
economic reforms started in earnest during the 1980s, emphasis was placed on 
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developing the coastal infrastructure to enable further economic growth.  With the 
initiation of the “Open Up the West” Campaign in 2000, development emphasis was 
shifted to the western provinces.   
When the “Open Up the West” policy was announced, the first key task 
mentioned was to “accelerate infrastructural construction.”52 The announcement stressed 
the importance of infrastructure development, 
The opening of the west depends on the main lines of communications 
including the Eurasian continental bridge, the waterways of Chang Jiang, 
and the southwest passage to the sea.  Make the most of central cities.  Use 
the main lines of transportation to link together the points.  Use the 
experience of selected points to guide work in an entire area.  The purpose 
is to gradually create economic belts that straddle administrative regions 
and display the characteristics of west china, such as the new Tibet-Gansu-
Qinghai-Lanzhou line, the upper reaches of the Chang Jiang, and the 
Nanning-Guiyang-Kunming region.  These regions will be the engine of 
growth for other areas so that the strategy of developing west China can be 
implemented step by step in order of priorities.53   
The western development program covers a broad range of projects.  One major 
grouping of projects focused on the “far west” provinces and Tibet.  Rail and road 
development was undertaken in remote areas of Xinjiang to connect them to both eastern 
China and to the Central Asian republics.  The initial steps of this project were started in 
the last days of the Soviet Union, but gained speed after the republics gained their 
independence.  The impact of these projects, especially with the increase of Chinese 
influence in Central Asia, has been studied in depth.54 
                                                 
52 Xinhua, "State Council Notice on Implementing some Policy Measures to Develop West China," 
Xinhua December 27, 2000, Open Source Center, CPP20001227000209. 
53  Ibid., (emphasis added) 
54 Garver, Development of China's Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-West and South 
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A second area of “Open Up the West” infrastructure development is the Pan-Pearl 
River Delta Region (PPRDR).55 This group of projects seeks to connect the economic 
boom areas of the Pearl River Delta, such as Guangdong and Fujian to lesser developed 
provinces in the western region.  Of note, this project seeks to link Guangxi and Yunnan 
infrastructure into the larger domestic Chinese market.  This project will also enable 
further overland links to ASEAN countries.56 
Overall, the Chinese transportation sector is rapidly expanding.  In recent years 
China’s logistics market has managed to average a 20 percent increase year-on-year. 
Despite the rapid development in the transportation sector, there are still areas of concern.  
One area of concern is total logistics cost, which are “almost double the figures in the 
United States and Japan.”  There is a capacity shortage, as noted in 2003 by Minister of 
Railroads, Liu Zhijun, 
Looking at the general state of railroad development, however, the 
problems of volume being on the low side and of shortage of transport 
capacity are still prominent, the contradiction of transport productive 
forces failing to meet the ever-growing social transport demand has not 
been fundamentally resolved, and the state of limited transport has not 
been fundamentally changed.57 
The Chinese government has started to address these problems, but the scale of the 
problem is staggering.  For instance, China has one-sixth of the track line in the world, 
but handles one-fourth of the rail cargo.   
China is making a concerted effort to develop its transportation infrastructure.  
This includes both road and rail development, with a final goal of creating a modern 
intermodal transportation network.  Since the inception of the “Open Up the West” 
campaign, the Chinese have spent $123 billion on express road construction.  If all 
                                                 
55 “PPRDR encompasses Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan 
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administrative regions, which have one fifth of China’s territory, and one third of the country’s 
population.” Lin Li, "China Expedites Construction of Land Links to ASEAN," Xinhua June 10, 2006, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-06/10/content_4678619.htm (accessed May 20, 2009). 
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planned projects are completed, the express road system will be longer than in the United 
States.58 Similar investments have been made in the railways.  In Yunnan province alone, 
Beijing has pledged $6.3 billion in railroad projects over three years.59 These projects are 
scheduled to add 1,500 kilometers of new track to just one province.  In order for the 
Chinese transportation sector to keep pace with economic growth, it will require massive 
investment in infrastructure for years to come. 
China is heavily investing in transportation infrastructure development to increase 
economic development, especially in the West.  Cross-border infrastructure should be 
viewed as part of China’s overall development plan to develop the West, not as a separate 
effort.  While the primary reason for the infrastructure development is to promote 
economic development, it also enables some aspects of Hirschman’s policies using the 
influence effect of trade.  If China decided to stop trade with bordering country, the 
domestic infrastructure would be in place to shift the trade from China’s border provinces 
to the larger domestic Chinese market, or to other foreign markets.  Thus, both Chinese 
cross-border and national infrastructure development is enabling aspects of Hirschman’s 
policy options.   
2. Vietnamese Domestic Initiatives 
Vietnam, like China, has invested heavily in transportation infrastructure 
development.  The Vietnamese goal is to develop a “unified, balanced and synchronous 
transport network.”60 The scale of the Vietnamese development is not as large as China’s, 
but it was starting from a similar low level in some areas.  Vietnamese domestic 
infrastructure development has occurred on two axis, north-south and east-west.  One of 
the key focus areas was north-south corridor connecting Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC).  Major road and rail projects have connected these main Vietnamese cities.  
Additional east-west projects have sought to expand the local access to this main north-
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south corridor, as well as providing connectivity to Cambodia, Thailand and Laos.  In 
2004, the Ministry of Transport established the Vietnam Expressway Corporation as a 
State Owned Enterprise (SOE) with a charter to promote the development of 
expressways.   
Vietnamese development has focused on three levels, providing a high capacity 
national road from Hanoi-to-HCMC, providing local access to roads in poverty reduction 
programs, and provincial roads to connect the first two sets.61 The VEC has spent $5.9 
billion in current projects, and is planning projects with a total investment of over $11.5 
billion on 1968 km of road infrastructure through 2015.62 Much of the $5.9 billion for 
road infrastructure development in Vietnam was funded through international 
organizations, such as the ADB, World Bank, Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC) and the Australian Agency for International Development.   Over 25 projects have 
been undertaken by Vietnam to improve the national highway and provincial roads 
network.  Four major programs have focused on developing the rural road network.  
Sixteen of these projects, mainly bridge repair projects, were funded with the assistance 
of JBIC.63 
Much of the “core” infrastructure is now in place in the Hanoi-HCMC axis, so the 
emphasis has shifted to expanding the development into the outlying areas. The 
Haiphong-Hanoi-Lao Cai corridor is an important road and rail line.  Projects are now 
underway to rehabilitate this corridor.  The infrastructure was over 100 years old and it 
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impeded the flow of traffic in some places.64 This project is interesting because it is 
viewed as important for both domestic and regional development.65 
Vietnam faces significant challenges in the transportation infrastructure sector.  
There is still a significant amount of rural area that is not connected to a modern 
transportation network.  Funding is one of the main problems for Hanoi.  This problem is 
magnified because some road and railway projects service similar areas.66 Vietnam, like 
China, needs to continue massive investments in transportation infrastructure to ensure 
that the system will be able to maintain pace with economic growth.   
B. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INITIATIVES 
There are three important aspects to the regional economic integration and cross-
border infrastructure projects between China and Vietnam.  First, the GMS economic 
corridors initiative provides an overarching regional framework for infrastructure 
development and provides economic goals.  This program encompasses all the countries 
of the GMS, while the ‘two corridors, one economic belt” initiative provides context for 
China and Vietnam bilateral development.  The “two corridors, one economic belt” 
initiative builds on the concepts of the GMS economic corridors, but puts a distinct 
bilateral spin on the development.   
A final aspect of the regional economic initiatives is the “soft infrastructure” 
development.  This includes the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).  The 
soft infrastructure complements the cross-border “hard infrastructure” development.  The 
“soft infrastructure” will enable greater trade flows by reducing both time and monetary 
costs associated with trade.  
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The three aspects of regional trade initiatives play an important role in promoting 
economic development and fostering trade between China and Vietnam.  These programs 
allow various aspects of Hirschman’s theory of using trade as national power by enabling 
trade.  China will be able to use the influence effect of trade through these programs, 
while the Vietnam may be able to foster transit trade.  The overall effect is one that will 
provide Beijing with mechanisms to exert its influence over Vietnam using trade. 
1. GMS Economic Corridors Initiative 
The main regional initiative promoting Sino-Vietnamese cross-border 
infrastructure is the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Corridors.  Shortly after its 
inception, the GMS identified transportation infrastructure as a key focus area for 
development.  Written in 1995, the GMS Master Transport Plan provided a goal for 
member states to achieve for cross-border infrastructure development, fostering trade and 
assist poverty reduction.  This plan was successful in fostering the initial development of 
regional trade.  In 1998, the original plan was modified from just transportation corridors 
into promoting economic corridors, which included transportation, energy, tourism and 
telecommunications.  Initially, three economic corridors were proposed: North-South, 
East-West and Southern corridors.67 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided 
significant funding for projects that supported these corridors.  Both road and rail links 
were included as part of the transportation corridors.  In 2002 and 2005, GMS leaders 
renewed their commitments to creating an integrated transportation infrastructure 
network that facilitated cross-border trade and economic development.   
The original three economic corridors expanded to six by 2006, and continued the 
march of economic integration and encompass additional cross-border infrastructure 
projects within the GMS countries.  The six corridors were identified as three North-
South Economic Corridors (NSEC), Kunming-Bangkok, Kunming-Haiphong and 
Nanning-Hanoi.  The two East-West corridors run from central Vietnam to Burma and  
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from central Vietnam to Bangkok.  The Southern corridor runs from Ho Chi Minh City to 
Bangkok.  Each of these corridors has its own infrastructure projects designed to facilitate 
economic activity.   
The North South Economic Corridor (NSEC) is one of the three priority areas for 
development in the GMS.  The technical assistance for the development of the North-
South Corridor is co-funded by China.  The PRC Poverty Reduction and Regional 
Cooperation Fund provided $400,000 the majority of the funding for the project, while 
the ADB provided $200,000.68 The goal of the technical assistance is to “develop 
mechanisms to translate political goodwill into economic cooperation at specific 
locations.”69 The study was designed to assist in formulating policies to stimulate private 
investment in the corridor and to provide an institutional framework for future 
development in the corridors. 
By 2007, the GMS transportation corridors had started to take shape, a new GMS 
Transportation Strategy was written.  Sponsored by the ADB, the GMS Transportation 
Strategy 2006-2015 expanded the number of economic corridors to nine, and placed 
greater emphasis on the cross-border “soft infrastructure” and trade facilitation.70 There 
are five main goals for the new strategy in order to create “seamless transport services on 
a fully connected and integrated GMS network.”  The first goal is to take advantage of 
“synergies” in the existing transport system.  National projects that are not cross-border 
initiatives can be leveraged to support cross-border goals and integrated into future 
planning.  This will eventually lead to the review and planning of how transportation 
infrastructure projects can benefit both local and regional goals.   
The GMS transportation Strategy also establishes the goal of creating an open 
market for transportation, modeled after the European Union.  The Strategy also covers 
creating an efficient, multimodal transportation system that will reduce trade costs and 
the development of institutions to foster trade.  Another interesting aspect of the GMS 
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transportation strategy is to complete the GMS network connections to South Asia.71 
While this will connect the GMS to emerging markets in South Asia, it may also benefit 
China by creating a transit trade on the existing transportation links between China and 
South Asia.  As Garver had identified, China is creating significant links to South Asia.72  
In conjunction with the proposed GMS economic corridors, links to South Asia will 
provide an additional means to create transit trade. 
The GMS Transportation Strategy provides a framework for the investment and 
cooperation on transportation infrastructure in the subregion.  In addition to creating 
synergies between with the existing transportation network, the GMS Transportation 
Strategy is to foster open markets and borders for transport services.  These advances will 
then lead to the development of an economic corridor that has much greater economic 
impact than just a transportation corridor. 
2. Two Corridors, One Economic Belt 
Since 2005, China and Vietnam have been working on a plan to utilize the GMS 
economic corridors to support a bilateral program called the “two corridors, one 
economic belt” initiative.  The infrastructure projects that are supporting the GMS 
economic corridors also support this bilateral initiative.  The two corridors run from 
Nanning to Hanoi and Hai Phong via Lang Son, and the second runs from Kunming to 
Hai Phong via Lao Cai.  The goal of the program is to improve the economic 
development through trade, tourism, industry and overall economic activity.  The 
Vietnamese government has stated that it expects GDP growth of 1.2 to 1.4 times higher 
than the rest of the country from the Nanning – Hanoi – Hai Phong corridor.73 
There are both highways and railway projects associated with the two corridors.  
For instance the Yen Vien-Lao Cai Railway Upgrading Project is an ADB funded project 
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aimed at upgrading the 100 year old railway that currently supports trade along the 
Kunming-Hanoi route.74 The ADB has also funded a new highway project from Noi Bai 
to Lao Cai.75 This project is geared to support a traffic growth ten percent increase a year 
through 2025.  There are additional projects in the planning phases, such as a highway 
project from Lang Son to Hanoi, and the corresponding Chinese project to connect this 
new road to the Chinese highway system.  Transportation infrastructure development in 
the GSM corridors is meant to support long term growth in trade and economic 
development for the region. 
The ultimate goal for the “two corridors, one economic belt” is to create economic 
corridors throughout the GMS.  As one study on the NSEC defines an economic corridor 
as “able to attract investment and generate economic activities along the less developed 
areas in the region.”76 Under this definition, both physical infrastructure and soft 
infrastructure are functioning.  According to projections, the infrastructure development 
along the corridor will decrease both transportation costs and transit time along the three 
branches of the NSEC by over 50 percent by 2015.  For the Haiphong – Kunming 
corridor, the transit time decreased from 85 hours in 2000, to 58 hours in 2006 and is 
projected to be 26.5 hours in 2015.77 This is a 69 percent decrease in the time for goods 
to transit between the locations.  The Nanning – Hanoi corridor will experience more 
dramatic gains.  Transit time is projected to be reduced by 75 percent when comparing 
2000 and 2015 transit times.  Due to hard and soft infrastructure development the trip that 
took 37 hours will be reduced to 8 hours.78 There will also be corresponding decreases in 
the cost of per ton of goods transported.  By 2015, the NSEC is planned to be a robust 
economic engine in the GMS with robust trade and generating its own economic activity. 
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Most of the funding for the infrastructure development projects is sponsored by 
through Asian Development Bank.  The funding for most of the North-South Economic 
corridor projects is not from Japan.  The Japanese have focused their funding, mainly in 
the form of JBIC loans, on the East-West corridors, because it does not want to support 
Chinese inroads to Southeast Asia.79 The ADB funding for the GMS economic corridors, 
on the other hand, has the stated purpose of increasing economic development and 
fostering regional integration of all GMS countries.  Other international donors are 
involoved in the development of the GMS economic corridors.  For instance, the Yen 
Vien-Lao Cai railway upgrade is being funded by the French Development Agency.  
China is providing the funding for railway signal upgrades along both routes from Hanoi 
to the Chinese border.  The Chinese government is providing $60.97 million of the total 
the $67.5 million project through a preferential credit.80 
The major Sino-Vietnamese bilateral overland transportation infrastructure 
projects are taking place under the aegis of the GMS North-South economic corridors.  
Infrastructure development enables further trade, and is a key aspect of Hirschman’s 
framework.  Without the infrastructure upgrades, many of Hirschman’s policies to 
maximize the influence effect of trade would not be effective, and in some cases possible.  
It is interesting that China has funded different aspects of Vietnam’s transportation 
infrastructure development while the Chinese have large domestic expenditures for the 
same types of projects.  Regardless of Chinese intentions, the transportation links being 
built will enable economic development and expansion of trade, as well as the 
opportunity for China to use Hirschman’s policies to maximize the influence effect of 
trade.   
3. “Soft” Infrastructure Development 
 “Soft” infrastructure development is an important aspect of cross-border 
infrastructure.  “Soft” infrastructure can have significant impact on the volume of cross-
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border trade.  For instance inefficient procedures at border crossing points can 
dramatically increase trade costs, both in time and monetary expense.  As one study of 
the GMS NSEC noted, “border crossings are the weakest link in the NSEC corridors and 
special attention must be made to deal with the required border issues.”81  In 2006, the 
Kunming-Haiphong corridor, 23 percent of the cost and 50 percent of the transportation 
time of goods was due to “soft” infrastructure issues at border crossings.82  The Nanning-
Hanoi corridor had similar costs associated with “soft” infrastructure.  In 2006, 48 
percent of the cost and 37 percent of the transportation time attributed to border crossing 
and “soft” infrastructure for goods in the Nanning-Hanoi corridor.83 
Studies suggest that government policies also play an important role to overcome 
the negative effect of domestic infrastructure development and fostering cross-border 
trade.  As one report noted, 
From this analysis, we conclude that the development of cross-border road 
infrastructure in the GMS has had a positive effect on the regional trade.  
The result that cross-border roads have distinct effects from domestic road 
infrastructure suggests promotion of regional trade may require deliberate 
policy shifts toward investments in roads in border areas.  In this light, 
cross-border road infrastructure becomes an important part of a broader 
effort to encourage regional integration to benefit GMS economies that are 
less endowed with natural seaports such as Lao PDR.84   
China, in particular has moved toward policies that sponsor cross-border trade.   
The best example of China implementing policy to promote cross-border trade is 
the proposed China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA).  Of note, the Singapore-
Kunming Rail Link and Bangkok-Kunming Highway projects are the first projects 
mentioned to be “undertaken or implemented on an accelerated basis” under the CAFTA 
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agreement.85 This demonstrates the importance that China puts on infrastructure 
development to promote trade with Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia.     
Of particular interest is the Early Harvest Package that gives preferential access to 
Chinese markets by the underdeveloped economies in ASEAN, including Vietnam.  The 
Early Harvest Package provides “incentives to accelerate the establishment” of the 
CAFTA by eliminating Chinese tariffs on certain agricultural products, while gradually 
phasing out tariffs for developing ASEAN countries, including Vietnam.   
C. CONCLUSIONS 
China and Vietnam have made great efforts at improving their overland 
transportation infrastructure.  These projects have required large amounts of resources 
and are directed at bilateral trade.  The projects should increase the cross-border trade by 
lowering transportation costs and improving efficiency.  For China it enables policies that 
could increase the influence effect of their trade.  While the intent for the infrastructure 
development is to increase economic development, an unintended consequence may be 
the increase in Chinese influence in Vietnam.   
Both “hard” and “soft” cross-border infrastructure projects between China and 
Vietnam enable increased trade.  With increased trade, Hirschman’s influence effect of 
trade becomes a factor that can be used in policy options.  While Vietnam will probably 
never be dependent on Chinese trade, as in Hirschman’s “ideal situation,” China can still 
pursue policies to maximize the immediate effects of a trade stoppage with Vietnam.  As 
a higher percentage of Vietnam’s trade volume with China, the greater Beijing’s 
influence becomes.  China has already undertaken the Early Harvest Package, which 
offers preferential treatment for Vietnamese goods to encourage increased trade in certain 
agricultural sectors.  In Hirschman’s framework, this can be seen as a way to manipulate  
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exports by purchasing goods at above-market prices, 86 as well as encouraging 
differences in the “consumption and production habits” by increasing trade in the 
agricultural sector.87  
Beijing may calculate that the price paid now by encouraging trade with Vietnam 
will be paid back in influence later.  Beijing will most likely place national goals, such as 
territorial claims in the South China Sea, above the short-term economic cost incurred by 
outlying provinces such as Yunnan and Guangxi Autonomous Region in the event of a 
trade stoppage with Vietnam.  If used, this policy option will carry costs for both sides, 
but the effects will affect Vietnam greater than China, as a greater portion of Vietnam’s 
overall trade is with China, than the portion of China’s trade with Vietnam.  Mechanisms 
for China to influence Vietnam using trade are being created through the development of 
cross-border infrastructure. 
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IV. ELECTRIC POWER INTERCONNECTIONS 
Electric power has been described by Chinese officials as a “fourth economic 
channel” along with air, land and sea.88 Electricity is an essential element for economic 
development in both China and Vietnam.  Infrastructure projects are being planned and 
built to connect China generation plants to Vietnam’s national high voltage grid.  Each of 
these projects integrating Chinese electricity into the Vietnamese power grid increases 
the potential for immediate losses on the Vietnamese economy from a supply disruption.  
According to Hirschman’s framework, Chinese influence will increase as these 
immediate losses become larger.  Thus, electric power is a second sector where China is 
creating a mechanism that enables the use of the influence effect of trade against 
Vietnam.   
Two recent Russian examples demonstrate the power of an energy rich country 
cutting off a source of energy.  In January 2006, the Russians shut down their natural gas 
pipeline into the Ukraine.  The effect was to decrease the supply of natural gas to 
customers throughout Europe.89 In January 2007, the Russians stopped their oil pipeline 
through Belarus, once again affecting downstream European customers.  While these 
disruptions were attributed to economic disputes, they did have significant geopolitical 
impacts.90 Short term supply disruptions for oil and natural gas imports do not have the 
same effect as an electric power supply disruption.  Oil and natural gas can be stored 
more readily than electricity. A major supply disruption also has different effects for a 
power grid, where a “cascade” effect shutting down the grid may result from an unevenly 
loaded grid.91 
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The Sino-Vietnamese cross-border electric power infrastructure development 
started with a few small projects in the late 1990’s.  The cross-border electric power 
infrastructure development began in earnest in 2004 when Vietnam was suffering a 
severe power shortage.  Now, there are sections of the Vietnamese grid, such as Quang 
Ninh province, that are dependent on Chinese electricity.92 There are plans to connect 
their two high voltage grids, the backbone of Vietnam’s electric power grid.  These 
bilateral developments must be taken in both domestic and regional contexts.  There is a 
trend toward greater electric power integration at both the domestic and regional levels.93 
As economic development progresses in China and Vietnam, Beijing and Hanoi 
have each undertaken various projects and initiatives to ensure a domestic electric power 
sector that can sustain economic growth. Both countries have been plagued by blackouts 
in recent years, but through massive investment programs China is now able to export 
electricity to Vietnam.94 China’s electricity exports are currently concentrated in 
Vietnam’s northern provinces, but they are expanding.  There have also been initiatives 
through various regional organizations, such as APEC and the GMS to promote 
infrastructure development with the goal of creating a regional power market for benefit 
of the region.  It is important to note that many of the Sino-Vietnamese bilateral 
initiatives extend beyond the scope of these regional programs.   
Through this mix of bilateral and regional programs intended to promote 
economic development, the Chinese are able to further integrate themselves into the 
regional electric power sector.  As a consequence of these policies, Vietnam becomes 
more reliant on Chinese electricity to fulfill demand for electricity and to maintain a 
stable electrical grid.  This reliance increases the immediate effects of a trade interruption 
and makes it more difficult for Vietnam to dispense entirely with Chinese exports.  
According to Hirschman’s framework, electricity exports allow Beijing to use the 
influence effect of trade against Hanoi.   
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A. CHINESE DOMESTIC ELECTRIC POWER INITIATIVES 
There are two major aspects for Chinese electric power initiatives, infrastructure 
development, which includes increasing generation capacity and developing transmission 
links, and regulatory reform.  Each of these initiatives was enacted to address a specific 
economic problem, but each will impact China’s ability to exert influence over Vietnam.  
The first initiative is infrastructure development of the electric power sector, specifically 
increasing power generation capability and upgrading the transmission system.  The 
generation capacity allows the China to have an excess capacity and generate revenue.  
Transmission lines provide the physical links to carry electricity from the generators to 
customers.  These two aspects are also seen as part of a larger regional economic 
development and cooperation policy.  Finally, regulatory reform was undertaken to better 
coordinate an electric power bureaucracy that was in dire need of a central decision 
making authority.  As a consequence, this also provides the central government a single 
agency, with direct access to senior leaders as well as the authority to implement policy, 
creating a single button to stop the flow of electricity if desired. 
1. Infrastructure Development 
For years China’s electric power sector has been plagued by uneven infrastructure 
development, as noted by former Premier Li Peng, 
A common problem in the electric power industry in the past was the 
over-emphasis on generation, while power supply was treated with neglect 
and distribution with indifference.  After construction was finished on a 
power generation plant, there would be trouble in power transmission.  
And when it did find its way to the power supply center, it was not put to 
use.95 
Uneven development was part of a vicious cycle of localized undersupply and 
oversupply.  Efforts to bring the problem under control were hampered by the lack of a 
central authority with the power to enforce an overall plan.  Mega-projects such as the 
west-east electricity transfer project (WEETP) in the “Open Up the West” campaign can 
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also be seen as a way “for the state to consolidate its control over what has been an 
extremely uncoordinated and inefficient system of power generation and distribution.”96 
In an effort to correct the uneven development problem, the Beijing undertook 
massive development projects.  Two examples of this are the Three Gorges project and 
the WEETP.  The Three Gorges project is the largest hydroelectric project in the world.  
The WEETP is a major infrastructure development program that aims to transmit electric 
power from the western portion of the country, where both coal and hydro resources are 
plentiful, to the east in order to satisfy the high demand for electricity associated with the 
economic development.97 First announced in 2000, this project focuses on power 
generation and transmission infrastructure development.  The plan calls for three power 
transmission channels, North, Central and South.98 The South channel, of particular 
interest in relation with Southeast Asia, involves developing power generation capacity in 
the western provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou and the development of an 
integrated transmission grid to Guangdong and the energy starved Pearl River Delta.99 
Eventually, all three channels will be connected into one national grid.  As one 
Chinese engineer explained,  
By 2010, the country will have a reasonably well-structured and clearly 
defined interconnected power network, where regional grids are closely 
interconnected.  After 2010, the nationally interconnected power network 
will have the Three Gorges power system as its center, where the strong 
regional and inter-regional grids are closely interconnected, carrying 
between them the hydropower generated along the Jinsha River, the 
Yalong River, the Dadu River, the Lancang River and the upper reach of 
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the Yellow River, as well as the power produced by the base of coal-fired 
plants in the “three Xi provinces” [Shanxi, Jiangxi and Shaanxi].100 
The WEETP has been hailed by officials as a way to transferring control of the 
sector to market forces stimulating private investment, but the project can also be viewed 
as a the state taking “control” of an “extremely uncoordinated and inefficient” sector.101 
China experienced an explosion in electric power generating capacity in recent 
years.  The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) claims that China’s total 
domestic generating capacity was 600 GW in 2006, up from 250 GW in 2002.102 The 
Chinese government is trying to control the new generation capacity being constructed, 
but this has proven to be a hard task.  Part of the problem is unapproved local projects 
that provide electricity for local areas, and may not be connected to the larger grid.  
While the 2005 estimates of the NRDC and Southern Grid Corporation (SGC) do not 
fully agree on the amount of generation capacity under construction, they both supported 
the fact that there would be a surplus capacity by 2007.103 
The NDRC believes that 150GW of power plants will be constructed 
between 2005 and 2007, while SGCs figure for the same period is 
190GW.  But according to one industry expert, around 180GW is under 
construction, around 30GW is awaiting approval and, more importantly, 
120GW of unapproved capacity is under construction.104 
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It remains to be seen if this generation surplus will last, and be enough to fulfill times of 
peak demand on the system.  One problem is that Beijing’s projections of electricity 
demand may not be accurate.  The problem is that state projections placed electricity 
demand growing by four to five percent for 2004 and 2005, while actual demand growth 
was around fifteen percent.  As unauthorized producers were brought on line, China 
faced an electricity surplus just two years after there were major shortages throughout the 
country.  According to the SERC, China generated 10 billion kilowatt hours of surplus 
electricity in 2006.105 This surplus is still relatively small, as China generated a total of 
2.3 trillion kilowatt hours in 2005.106 
It is interesting to note that in early 2005, while there were still significant power 
shortages in some provinces, China began to export electricity to Vietnam.  When 
questioned on if this was a proper policy when there were still domestic shortages, Zhao 
Jinping, deputy director of the Research Department of Foreign Economic Relations of 
the Development Research Center under the State Council, commented that the exported 
electricity is from “new supplies” that had been “produced specifically for export.”107 No 
specific generation projects were named, but the article implies that the Lancang River108 
hydro potential will be developed for export.  The excess hydro generating capacity is 
focused in areas that were far away from the outages, but close to export markets.  
The transmission sector has also been a targeted for development.  The WEETP 
has focused on development of high voltage transmission lines from the western 
provinces of Guizhou, Yunnan and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region to the Pearl 
River Delta.  The back bone of this project has been 500kV lines that have been able to 
increase the amount of electricity transmitted over these long distances.  In addition to the 
500kV lines, the Chinese have started construction on an 800kV transmission line from 
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Yunnan through Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region to Guangdong, a distance of over 
1400km.  This is a major transmission project, estimated at over $1.6 billion, and is the 
first in the world to utilize 800 kV direct current transmission lines.109 NDRC plans on 
spending $25.6 billion in power grids in 2007.110 
Despite the massive amount of investment in transmission assets, China still faces 
the problem of getting enough electricity from where it is produced to where it is 
consumed.  Yunnan Province, with a quarter of China’s total hydro potential, will 
continue to export its electricity to other regions.  There are limitations on amount that 
can be currently transmitted over the current and planned infrastructure.  Yunnan location 
also makes it convenient to export electricity to Vietnam.  This is especially attractive if 
the revenue generated from these projects can be reinvested on additional generating 
capacity and domestic transmission assets.   
The Chinese are making massive investments in their domestic electric power 
infrastructure.  While there have been problems with blackouts in the recent past, they are 
now in a period of surplus, with more generating capacity coming on line.  It remains to 
be seen if this surplus will last, as electric consumption growth has traditionally outpaced 
economic growth.  This time may prove to be different, however, as the infrastructure 
development is part of an overall plan to improve efficiency and restore orderly 
development in the sector.  It has been noted that the existing surplus may not be enough 
to avoid power shortages in certain peak times.111 Despite being faced with these 
domestic challenges of a surging demand for electricity, China is developing 
infrastructure to facilitate long term export of electric power to third countries. 
2. Regulatory Reform 
One of the major issues for the Chinese government and the economy in general 
is powering its vast spaces.  This major problem can be further divided into two 
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categories, demand and system development.  Demand for electric power has surged in 
recent years as reforms encouraged economic growth.  The immediate need to keep the 
lights on for the economy comes at direct expense of overall system development.  As 
noted before, local officials facing an immediate need for electricity have authorized and 
constructed small, inefficient generation facilities to fulfill their local need, often with 
little or no coordination with the national plan.  Various organizations were in charge of 
individual parts of energy policy making it difficult to discern an overall direction.  As 
Bo Kong notes,  
[t]he way energy institutions are structured and operate in China 
predisposes the country toward a series of loosely connected policies that 
are inconsistent, short-sighted and ad hoc, precluding them from 
producing any coherent and long-term energy strategy.112   
This quote accurately describes the energy sector as a whole, but also applied to 
the structure of the electric power sector as well.  The problems brought about by the 
significant jump in demand were exacerbated by uncoordinated planning at both national 
and local levels.113 Some analysts have described the “institutional insecurity” in China’s 
energy sector as cyclical and institutional.  Cyclical insecurities in the form of power 
shortages were “seasonal, regional, sector specific and temporary.”114 Institutional 
insecurity is a product of the fragmented nature of the energy decision makers and 
produces a situation where there are “too many cooks in the kitchen.”115 Given this 
situation of competing interests, it is hard to imagine that Beijing is able to intentionally 
enact policies to maximize the influence effect of electricity exports.  
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Numerous uncoordinated projects have led to the problems integrating the 
development into a coherent system and hampered long-term planning.  One of the best 
examples of this is when the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) 
issued a policy of “no coal fired plants in the next three years” based on economic 
assessments in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis.116 The data used grossly 
underestimated demand, and power shortages occurred in 2002 and continued to 
worsen.117 The energy shortage then spurred ad hoc development that led to surpluses of 
electricity in late 2006.118 
These institutional problems, however, are starting to be addressed by Beijing.  In 
2002, the State Power Corporation was dismantled, and split into six regional power 
markets and five major companies.119 This split also separated power generation and 
transmission assets under different organizations. The breaking of this monopoly was 
seen as an essential element to reforming the electric power sector. The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), with power over review and approval of 
new power projects, and the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) a central 
electricity regulatory body, were strengthened by giving them clearer mandates and 
greater authority to enforce policy.  Under the 2005 regulations, the SERC has two basic 
tasks, “supervision and enforcement in the power sector.”120 These institutional reforms 
are important as they are widely seen as needed modernize the electric power sector.  
While some say that the reforms do not go far enough, these are major changes with the 
SERC being the first independent electricity regulator in China’s history.121 These 
reforms have empowered an independent regulator with the power shut down 
transmission assets.   
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A second key aspect of electric power sector reforms occurred in May 2005, with 
the formation of the State Energy Leading Small Group (LSG).  This group is led by Wen 
Jiabao and two Vice Premiers Huang Ju and Zeng Pieyan, with the task of providing 
guidance for the energy sector.  It is also interesting to note that Wen Jiabao and Zeng 
Pieyan were also members of the Leading Group on Western Development, which 
oversaw the plan for the major infrastructure programs, including the WEETP.  Other 
members of the energy LSG include officials who are concerned about foreign policy and 
the projection of national power.   
The group members include 13 top leaders from the country’s major 
ministries and administrations such as the Minster of the NDRC Ma Kai, 
Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai, Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Zhaoxing 
and Minister of the State Commission of Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defence Zhang Yunchuan.122 
While this group does not meet on a regular basis, it does provide a direct link from the 
senior leadership to the both the NDRC, with authority over the electric power 
generation, and SERC, the transmission regulator. The LSG enables the senior leadership 
direct access to the bodies that can control electric power generation and transmission.123 
If the senior leadership deems that it wants to use the electric power mechanism to exert 
pressure on Vietnam, the LSG provides direct access to the relevant regulatory bodies.  
As with other reforms, the formation of the LSG does not necessarily demonstrate 
Beijing’s intention to use the mechanism, but the point here is that a mechanism has been 
created. 
Electric power sector reforms have been put in place to the break up the state 
monopoly and pave the way for setting up power markets to better respond to the 
growing economy.  The consequence of these reforms, however, is to empower an  
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independent regulator, with direct access to senior leadership. This sets up the 
organizational aspect of a mechanism to use electric power exports as a way to influence 
their international customers. 
B. VIETNAMESE DOMESTIC ELECTRIC POWER INITIATIVES 
Vietnam faces some of the same challenges as China with infrastructure 
development and regulation reform, but not on the same scale.  Vietnam, like China, has 
implemented some major regional initiatives to generate and transmit power.  Of 
particular interest are the seven northern provinces that border China and the adjoining 
provinces that from the northern and northwestern regions, as well as the Hanoi area.  
These areas make up the primary importers of China’s electricity.   
Vietnam has undertaken various major electric power generation and transmission 
projects.  There have been both major hydroelectric and thermal power generation 
projects, such as Son La and Huoi Quang hydro projects in the north and the O Mon 
thermal complex in the south.  These projects have received a significant amount of 
funding from international agencies such as the ADB and the Japan Special Fund.124 One 
of the main problems with this massive amount of construction is finding financing for all 
the projects.  Vietnam has been trying to attract foreign investors as a way to find capital.  
Vietnamese officials have increased prices and have made initial steps toward a power 
market.125 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also sponsored various projects for 
regional infrastructure development in Vietnam, most notably the Northern Power 
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Transmission sector project and subsequent expansion projects.126 These projects aim to 
expand the transmission network in northern Vietnam and connect other power 
generation projects to Vietnam’s transmission grid and pave the way for future links to 
the Chinese grid.   
Vietnam’s electricity sector is controlled by Electricity Vietnam (EVN).  
According to the Asian Development Bank, EVN is a “state-owned corporation that 
accounts for more than 85 percent of power generation, bulk power transmission, and 
power distribution either directly or through intermediaries in some rural areas.”127 There 
have been attempts to reform the energy laws, various initiatives for the electricity 
sector.128 Of note, the Electricity Regulatory Authority of Vietnam (ERAV) was 
authorized in 2004 and established in October 2005.  This body is tasked with ten 
regulatory and planning duties, including developing energy markets and overseeing 
electric business licenses.129 Like the Chinese reforms, Vietnam’s reforms are aimed at 
an eventual transition to a power market, which is one of the stated goals of the technical 
assistance from the ADB.130 
Vietnam has experienced power shortages in the past few years.  The effects of 
these shortages has been somewhat alleviated by importing electricity from China, 
especially for the northern provinces.  In the summer of 2005, Hanoi was forced to 
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introduce “preemptive measures against a potentially serious power shortage.”131 In the 
first part of May 2005, electric power usage had surged 28 percent year over year.132 The 
surging demand was coupled with a nationwide drought that threatened hydro 
resources.133 There was also a crisis in the summer of 2006.  Phu My 2-2 plant, one the 
largest plants in Vietnam, went offline because of equipment malfunction.134 Other plants 
had to run at maximum capacity to make up the difference, which led to additional 
malfunctions and shutdowns.  Some plants, such as the Hoa Binh hydro plant, were 
forced to run at maximum capacity or on inefficient resources, such as diesel fuel.135 In 
response to the shortages, Hanoi streamlined procedures and attempted to speed 
completion of some projects.  Despite importing electricity from China and constructing 
25 additional electric power projects, electricity shortages continued into 2007-08.136 
Even with this new capacity, Vietnam is looking to import more electricity from China, 
and exploring the potential for importing electricity from Laos after 2008.137 
Vietnam has undergone a significant amount of domestic infrastructure 
development and has started on the path toward bureaucratic and regulatory reform.  As 
Vietnam continues to grow economically, they will require more and more electricity.  
The Vietnamese have grown increasingly comfortable with relying on importing 
electricity from its neighbors to satisfy their demand for electricity.  As a consequence, 
Vietnam is increasing vulnerable to a stoppage of trade in electricity, and therefore, 
Chinese influence.   
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C. REGIONAL ELECTRIC POWER INITIATIVES 
There have been a number of regional initiatives that involve the electric power 
sector.  The largest regional organization that has supported electric power 
interconnections is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. APEC is not 
involved with the physical infrastructure, but it does provide insight to larger regional and 
global trends in the electric power sector.  Smaller regional groupings have started on 
building infrastructure and taking the initial steps toward the creation of a regional power 
market.  Vietnam is involved in the trans-ASEAN electric power grid, and the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS) flagship initiative for electric power.  China is a participant in 
the GMS initiative.  These regional initiatives reveal that the trend toward power grid 
interconnections is not limited to China or Southeast Asia.  They also provide an end goal 
that can shape the direction of the bilateral projects. 
1. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Electric Power 
Interconnections 
The APEC region is undergoing a trend toward electric power integration.  Three 
major areas of integration have been identified, in addition to the already integrated North 
American market.  The three regions are South America, Northeast Asia and Southeast 
Asia.  China figures as a player in the latter two regions.138 
While there are no formally approved plans for an integrated Northeast Asian 
power grid, there have been major proposals to integrate the electrical grid for the region.  
There are multiple proposed connections between China and Russia.  Some of these 
proposals also include connections from Russia to the Republic of Korea (ROK) through 
both China and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).  The majority of these 
proposals involve high voltage lines of 500kV and 600kV.139 
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The reports from APEC on physical interconnections in the Southeast Asian 
region focus on existing Trans-ASEAN and Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) projects 
which will be discussed later.  While APEC does not focus on the physical infrastructure, 
they do provide insight to the international context for the establishment of a power 
market involving China and its neighbors.   
There are various benefits of interconnection cited in the APEC sponsored reports 
of the Asian Pacific Energy Research Center, mainly economic and environmental, while 
there is only a cursory mention of “supply security concerns” and “political uncertainty.”  
One report advances the optimistic view that interconnected power systems are “not 
likely to pose a real problem in APEC region if all parties appreciate the mutual benefits 
of interconnection.”140 While this may be true in some of the regions, such as North 
America, there remains the possibility of disruption of supply as a tool to influence a 
neighbor’s behavior. 
The APEC also commissioned a study on the barriers of cross-border power.  
Among the fourteen barriers identified, the first two discussed were public fear and 
political barriers.  The public fears section addresses the “insecurity of supply.”  It draws 
on the example of the European Union (EU), and how the European Commission 
determined that integration of their electricity and gas systems provided the “best 
guarantee of security of supply and consumer protection.”141 They also suggest that the 
best ways to overcome the political barriers is involvement in international organizations 
and participating in the development of regional solutions.   
While APEC has not undertaken any electric power projects in China or Vietnam, 
they do indicate the larger trend toward interconnected electric power systems.  APEC 
shows a broad acceptance of the benefits of interconnecting regional power grids.  Based 
on the APEC sponsored reports, increased connections between China and Vietnam 
would be looked at in a positive light by the international community.   
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2. Trans-ASEAN Electric Power Initiatives 
The ten members of ASEAN have started to integrate their electric power 
transmission grids as part of their regional energy cooperation strategy.  Energy 
cooperation in ASEAN has progressed and there are numerous venues for ASEAN 
members do discuss regional initiatives.  These include the ASEAN Ministers on Energy 
Meeting (AMEM), and the Senior Officials Meeting on Energy (SOME).  One of the 
main bodies spearheading the Trans-ASEAN power grid is the Heads of ASEAN Power 
Utilities / Authorities (HAPUA).  Each of these various fora has advocated the Trans-
ASEAN power grid.   
The stated reasons behind the trans-ASEAN electric power transmission grid are 
the economic and environmental benefits.  The end goal is a functioning power market.  
The economic benefits would be gained by allowing efficient use of resources, increased 
reliability and quality of electricity.142 The environmental advantages would be the 
increased use of renewable resources, while avoiding the need for inefficient systems to 
be constructed.  These projects are not meant to replace a member’s own grid, but rather 
augment their existing grid.   
According to the HAPUA Secretary-in-Charge, Andy Purnama Roesli, the current 
plans call for three subregional transmission grids. These include one grid that connects 
Indonesia, Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore, known as IMS, the Trans-Borneo grid, 
and the GMS grid.143 A total of 14 projects are currently being explored to complete the 
project, with two already operational.144 These projects are high voltage transmission 
lines, with the notable exception being the projects between Cambodia and Vietnam.145 
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3. Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Electric Power Flagship Initiative 
The GMS flagship initiative is similar to the trans-ASEAN grid for the GMS 
region, except that it also includes two Chinese provinces, Yunnan and Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region.146 Vietnam and Thailand are expected to be the largest electricity 
importers in the region, with Yunnan, with its large hydroelectric potential, being the 
largest exporter.147 
In 2003, the ADB in The Technical Assistance for Preparing the GMS Power 
Interconnection Project, Phase 1 proposed ten projects throughout the region.  The plans 
for the GMS grid, however, called for only one project connecting China and Vietnam.  
The proposed project consisted of one high voltage line, of undetermined voltage, 
between Malutang Hydro Power Plant in Yunnan province and Soc Son, Vietnam.  The 
project was not scheduled to be completed until 2019.  Vietnam had a total of five other 
projects connecting it with Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand (via Laos).  The timeline for 
these projects ranged from 2004 to 2019.  China had a total of two projects, one with 
Thailand, scheduled to be completed in 2013, and one with Vietnam.148 
The rationale for the GMS interconnection is similar to the trans-ASEAN grid.  
One major stated benefit from a regional grid would be “cooperating in the development 
and complementary use of the subregion’s energy resources, especially given their 
uneven distribution.”149 The plan also calls for the efficient use of the available 
resources, while reducing operational costs and system losses.  It is interesting to note 
that environmental benefits are mentioned, but the potential impact of the upstream 
damming of the Lancang is mentioned in passing as “unresolved social (for example, 
resettlement) and environmental issues.”150 
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The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have been major proponents 
for the development of a power market in the GMS.  The strategy is to promote bilateral 
trade, while at the same time work out the institutional structures and infrastructure 
development that will allow transition to a regional grid and, eventually, a regional power 
market.  The initial World Bank report outlines a number of barriers in four categories: 
technical, institutional and commercial and financial, and policy.151 The report is one of 
the few that notes national security concerns: 
In addition, although it is not always stated, national security concerns 
regarding self sufficiency constitute an important policy objective in 
several countries.  This focus on domestic needs acts as an actual barrier to 
trade.152 
It is important to remember that this report was published before China started its “charm 
offensive” in Southeast Asia, and before it was heavily engaged with ASEAN.  More 
recent reports make passing reference to possible national security implications of 
significantly augmenting domestic supply with imported electricity.   
Critics have noted that the proposal for the GMS regional grid does not provide 
increased reliability.153 One argument is that the remote hydroelectric plants are more 
prone to transmission line failures because of their long distances over difficult terrain.  
They also note that hydroelectric is not the most reliable source for large amounts of 
power, as they can be affected by droughts and other competing interests for the water.  
This however, does not seem to be a major concern for China at this time.154 The 
argument against reliability of a large grid, however does not mention the potential for 
the grid to be intentionally shut down.  They do point out that if there is a large 
disruption, there is an increased potential for major portions of the grid to be disrupted, 
similar to a failures in Brazil and in the United States.  While critics of the proposed 
                                                 
151 World Bank, Power Trade Strategy for the Greater Mekong Subregion (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 1999). 
152  Ibid., 18. 
153 Gráinne Ryder, The Greater Mekong Subregion Hydro Grid: A Review of the Asian Development 
Bank’s 2003 Indicative Master Plan for Regional Power Interconnections and Power Trade in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (Toronto: Energy Probe Research Foundation, 2004). 
154 Liebman, Trickle-Down Hegemony? China's "Peaceful Rise" and Dam Building on the Mekong. 
  55
GMS power grid tend to be more environmentally based, they do raise interesting points 
about how the disruption in supply could affect large areas of the grid.  This is something 
that China may be able to use to its advantage, as it would be the major supplier to its 
neighbors. 
D. SINO-VIETNAMESE BILATERAL ELECTRIC POWER INITATIVES 
Bilateral electric power projects between China and Vietnam have increased in 
recent years, beyond the scope of the regional initiatives already discussed.  Bilateral 
initiatives will be the most important way that China will be able to use the electric power 
as a mechanism to influence Vietnam.   
Bilateral infrastructure development analysis here is divided into two categories, 
physical infrastructure and financial support.  First, the bilateral physical infrastructure 
projects can be associated with either Yunnan Province or Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region.  China Southern Power Grid is the company that operates the power grid in both 
provinces, and they also control the cross-border infrastructure development through its 
subsidiary companies Yunnan Power Grid Company and Guangxi Power Grid Company.  
EVN is their counterpart in Vietnam.  There are various types of electric power 
transmission projects including 110kV and 220kV lines and a planned 500kV project.  
The overall trend is to increase the amount of electricity exported to Vietnam from 
various generation plants in Yunnan and Guangxi. 
The second type of project involves Chinese support of Vietnamese electrical 
infrastructure projects, including funding and building major projects in Vietnam.  China 
has provided funding in the form of preferential loans to Vietnam for electric power 
infrastructure development.  The Chinese are also helping to construct the Vietnamese 
infrastructure through joint ventures, build-operate-transfer programs and winning 
various construction contracts inside Vietnam. 
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1. Cross-border Transmission Projects 
In 2007, Vietnam imported two percent of its national electricity supply from 
China and by 2009 this figure had doubled to four percent.155 While Vietnam imports a 
small percentage of total electricity demand, the imported electricity is used in only two 
geographic areas.  The relative percentage of Chinese imports to domestic supply is 
higher in these areas.  The first area is supplied by Yunnan province, and consists of Lai 
Chau, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang and Phu Tho provinces.  These 
provinces roughly correspond to provinces included in the first GMS North-South 
economic corridor.  The second area is the coastal province of Quang Ninh, supplied by 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.  There are also plans for an additional 
transmission project to cover Cao Bang and Bac Can provinces.156 Hanoi is planning to 
construct smaller scale hydroelectric plants to provide electricity for more remote areas of 
the northern provinces.  According to press reports, a total of 37 planned projects will 
provide local coverage to rural customers.  Vietnam plans to have 70 percent of the 
northern provinces connected to the national grid, while the remainder will be supplied 
by local small-scale sources.157 
There are multiple cross-border electric power transmission projects being 
undertaken in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces.  There are several transmission lines of 
various voltages that China uses to export electricity to Vietnam.  In April 2004, China 
started to export electricity over two 110kV lines from Yunnan and Guangxi to supply 
Vietnam’s northern provinces of Lao Cai and Quang Ninh, respectively.  In July 2005, a 
third 110kV line was installed from Maomaotian, Yunnan province to Ha Giang and Yen  
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Bai provinces.  By September 2006, Vietnam had imported over 1 billion kWh of 
electricity from China using three 100kV lines connected to eleven transformer stations 
in six of Vietnam’s northern provinces.158 
In that same month, a higher capacity 220kV line became operational connecting 
Hekou county in Yunnan to Viet Tri city in Phu Tho province.  A second 220kV line is 
scheduled to be operational by April 2007, which will connect from the Chinese border in 
Ha Giang to Soc Son via Thai Nguyen.159 Both lines started construction on early 2005.  
These lines are significant as they provide two lines for Chinese electricity into the main 
grid network that serves the Hanoi area.  These links were made possible by the ADB 
funded Northern Power Transmission Expansion Project (NPTEP) that financed the 
construction of a new 500kV and 220kV substation at Soc Son. The Soc Son substation 
was described as “a strategic link” between the eastern and western Vietnamese power 
generators with the “potential for subsequent interconnection” with China.160 
The NPTEP also contained the expansion of the 500kV network in northern 
Vietnam making the connection to the Chinese 500kV grid more feasible.  A cross-border 
500kV line is in the planning phases, which would double Vietnam’s current import 
capacity.  There are a few possible routes for the line to connect the Vietnamese grid.  
One possible location is at Mong Duong in Quang Ninh province connecting to the 
Guangxi grid.  Another possible line is from Yunnan to Soc Son, outside of Hanoi.  In the 
future, it is possible that both Mong Duong and Soc Son will be connected to Chinese 
500kV lines. 
It is interesting to note that in ADB loan documents for the Northern Power 
Transmission Sector Project in November 2004; there is no mention of cross-border 
connections for the high voltage lines proposed by the project.161 Subsequent documents 
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for the World Bank in July 2005 and for ADB in November 2005 both mention 
transmission connections with China.162 This change corresponds to severe power 
shortages in Vietnam, which seem to have accelerated plans to import electricity from 
China.  Also, the success of the initial small scale 110kV programs probably contributed 
to the decision to expand the cross-border connections.   
Chinese electricity imports have become essential for some provinces.  Quang 
Ninh province now imports 30 percent of its electricity from China.163 If Vietnamese 
economic growth continues at the current pace, along with the demand for electricity, 
there will probably be more cross-border electric power transmission projects.  As 
Vietnam attempts to expand domestic capacity, the power shortages continue.  
Vietnamese leaders are increasingly comfortable importing electricity from China, 
leading to an increased volume of imports and cross-border infrastructure projects. 
Vietnam’s northern provinces are increasing relying on China to fill their need for 
electricity, and thus creating Vietnamese dependence on China for a resource that is 
essential for continued economic growth.  
2. Chinese Financial Support 
The Chinese have started to provide financial support to the Vietnamese electric 
power sector.  The assistance is in the form of low interest loans, joint ventures and build-
own-transfer (BOT) schemes.164 These projects, like the transmission lines, are 
undertaken for economic reasons, but they increase Chinese presence within Vietnam’s 
electric power sector.  The number of these projects is only growing as the Vietnamese 
officials become increasingly comfortable with Chinese involvement in the electric 
power sector.   
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China has provided funding for many projects in the Vietnamese power sector.  
The China Exim Bank has provided financing for projects, mainly focused on the 
northern provinces.  Of note, China Exim Bank has provided funding for a Hai Phong 1 
thermo- electric plant and credit for the Quang Ninh 1 project.165 These projects seem to 
be focused in the northern sectors of the country.  Some of the projects that are funded by 
Chinese banks are constructed by Chinese contractors, such as the Cao Ngan hydro plant, 
north of Hanoi.166 In particular, the Quang Ninh and the Hai Phong projects are reported 
to have over 2,000 Chinese unskilled laborers at each plant.  Chinese workers have also 
been utilized on a thermo-power plant project in Nong Son in the central province of 
Quang Nam.  The Chinese contractors use almost no Vietnamese labor.167 Chinese 
contractors have utilized Chinese laborers on various electric power projects throughout 
Vietnam. 
Sino-Vietnamese joint company projects been contracted to develop various 
power plants.  Yunnan Power Grid Company has contracted for “co-operation in small- 
and medium- sized hydroelectric projects in Vietnam.”168 This is the same Chinese 
company that exports electricity to Vietnam from Yunnan province.  This brings up the 
prospect of China not only disrupting the electricity supply, but also the construction of 
future power plants in Vietnam.  Other Chinese companies are also involved in joint 
ventures constructing Vietnamese power plants in the northern provinces.169 
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China has also engaged in build-own-transfer schemes.  One prominent project 
funded by Yunnan Power Grid Company is a thermo power plant in the southern 
province of Binh Thuan worth $1.4 billion.170 
The amount of cooperation also brings up the expansion of Chinese “soft power” 
through people-to-people connections, and the development of human capital in 
Vietnam’s electricity sector.  One commentator on Voice of Vietnam “praised” Sino-
Vietnamese cooperation with specific emphasis on the electric power sector. 
The agreement between the Vietnam Coal and Minerals Corporation and 
the Chinese Import Export Bank on the provision of a credit of $225 
million for the first phase of construction project of the Cam Pha thermal 
power plant with a 300-mW capacity, and the intended cooperation in 
energy industry, construction of infrastructure projects…personnel 
resource development…and so forth will create new progress and stronger 
momentum for development of economic and trade cooperation between 
the two countries.171   
With power shortages predicted to continue through 2010, Vietnam’s electric 
power sector financing may increase come from foreign investors.  China is one of the 
countries targeting electric power infrastructure projects.  These will most likely continue 
into the foreseeable future.   
According to Hirschman’s framework, China is creating technical dependencies 
by constructing Vietnam’s power plants.  Depending on the technology used, Vietnam 
may be reliant on the Chinese to repair or upgrade these plants.  China is also creating 
Vietnamese dependency on Chinese workers to construct the facilities.  For the time 
being, China may be able to withdraw this labor, and delay the projects.  Construction 
delays would further delay Vietnam’s ability to step up domestic electricity production to 
replace lost Chinese imports, in the event of a trade stoppage.  Once Chinese designed 
plants are completed, Vietnam may be dependent on Chinese replacement parts, creating 
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another dependence on China.  Funding and constructing the electric power infrastructure 
in Vietnam enhances China’s ability to use the influence effect of trade.   
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The cross-border development of an electrical power grid promotes the economic 
development of both China and Vietnam.  China currently has a surplus of power 
generation capacity with the potential to develop additional clean, renewable energy 
projects.  This provides both economic and environmental benefits for both countries.  
From an economic perspective, it is a “win-win” situation, China provides Vietnam with 
a product that is essential for Vietnam’s economic growth.  Vietnam is supplied with a 
resource that enables continued economic development.  
One less-mentioned consequence of this trade in electric power is that it provides 
a mechanism for China to influence Vietnam. Infrastructure is in place to enable the 
Chinese use of this mechanism.  The development of this mechanism is not the primary 
reason for the development of the bilateral electric power trade, but it exists nonetheless.   
The use of this mechanism will also incur costs for the Chinese.  The ideal use of 
this mechanism may be to avoid the situation where trade will actually be deliberately cut 
off for long term, allowing Vietnam to shift trade or increase domestic production.  There 
are multiple scenarios are possible where trade can be either disrupted or fully interrupted 
for short periods, such as infrastructure “maintenance” or a “malfunction.”  This may 
serve to “remind” Vietnam of the extent that it is reliance on China for various aspects of 
its economic growth, while providing Beijing plausible deniability.  The threat of a 
disruption may also be enough to alter Vietnamese behavior.   
Liberal international relations theorists argue that the increased trade would lead 
to a decreased chance of conflict.172 Hirschman argues the influence effect of trade 
increases with “the greater the immediate loss, which it can inflict by a stoppage of 
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trade.”173 So while trade may be viewed as a deterrent for armed conflict, it can also 
increase the influence that one trading partner has over the other.  Just as Hirschman 
noted that pre-war Germany did not deliberately create mechanisms for trade influence 
over their neighbors, the Chinese efforts supplying electricity to Vietnam are under the 
mask of economic growth and mutual benefit.174 Vietnam may realize too late that their 
growing demand for electricity led them to far into China’s sphere of influence.   
Unlike recent Russian examples, short term supply disruptions for oil and natural 
gas imports do not have the same effect as an electric power supply disruption.  Oil and 
natural gas can be stored more readily than electricity.  A major supply disruption also 
has different effects for a power grid, where a “cascade” effect shutting down the grid 
may result from an unevenly loaded grid.175 A Chinese supply disruption, especially if 
connected to the 500kV grid, could potentially affect major areas of Vietnam.  If the 
supply is not resumed, it would be difficult for Vietnam to recover from the disruption 
without significant reduction in demand.  This would be magnified in the northern 
provinces, such as Quang Ninh, that have become dependent on Chinese electricity 
exports.  Vietnamese officials have indicated that residential customers would face the 
first power cuts in the event of blackouts due to increased demand, but that Ho Chi Minh 
City and Hanoi would have fewer cuts.176 It remains to be seen how Vietnamese would 
cope with widespread power outages due to the loss of Chinese electricity.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
China and Vietnam have undertaken massive infrastructure development 
programs in the overland transportation and electric power sectors. In addition to 
domestic programs, many cross-border projects are underway, increasing the capacity for 
existing trade, and creating new trade opportunities, such as electricity.  With the support 
of regional organizations, such as the GMS and ASEAN and with funding from 
international donors, such as the ADB and World Bank, these projects have steadily 
progressed.  
The GMS economic corridors have laid the physical basis for expanding bilateral 
trade relations.  While there will be mutual economic benefits from this trade, there may 
be unintended geopolitical consequences.  According to Hirschman’s framework, these 
infrastructure projects will enable China, if it chooses, to use the influence effect of trade 
against Vietnam.  China is more likely to use these mechanisms as the influence effect 
favors large countries with diversified trading partners, which can easily shift their 
trading patterns.  A smaller country, like Vietnam, that relies heavily on a larger trading 
partner can be harmed more with the immediate effects of a trade stoppage.  The resulting 
situation means that a smaller country is likely to avoid a trade interruption and will be 
influenced by the larger trading partner.   
Large infrastructure projects, such as roads, railways, and electric power grids, are 
bilateral in nature.  They promote trade between two specific countries and require large 
amounts of investment, which signifies longer term economic commitments.  They 
promote trade and economic development, in some cases, such as electric power, 
infrastructure development is a prerequisite for trade.   
The stated rationale is that these projects will promote economic development and 
mutual benefits.  They will surely set the conditions that enable additional economic 
growth, either through and expanded transportation system or the ability to supply 
electricity to a growing economy.  There may be unintended consequences from these  
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policies.   Vietnam may become vulnerable to an interruption or stoppage of trade.  
According to Hirschman’s framework, the greater the immediate effects of a trade 
stoppage, the greater the influence exerted.   
The Chinese may not have the influence effect of trade as the primary motivator 
for their cross-border infrastructure development with Vietnam.  Economic development 
and growth is in their interest as well as Vietnam’s.  However, much like German trade 
policy in the 1930s, the Chinese are creating mechanisms that can be used to exert 
influence on their neighbors, in particular Vietnam, with infrastructure development 
being a key step.  These mechanisms may prove useful in case there is not a “win-win” 
situation between China and Vietnam, such as a territorial dispute in the South China Sea.  
Vietnam may take measures to limit the immediate effects of a Chinese stoppage 
of trade.  First they diversify their trade.  They can look to their more developed 
neighbors, such as Thailand.  They can also try to further develop overseas markets, such 
as the United States and Europe.  In the electric power sector they can accelerate 
interconnections with their ASEAN neighbors, expand their domestic generation capacity 
and promote efficiency.  Foremost on their agenda should be to limit the amount of areas 
where they are dependent on Chinese imports, as is the case for electricity in the northern 
provinces.  Vietnam may be able to minimize the immediate effects of a trade stoppage 
with China, and therefore limit their vulnerability to the influence effect of trade. 
Hirschman’s framework provides a useful tool to analyze the potential effects of 
Sino-Vietnamese cross-border infrastructure development.  Mechanisms to use the 
influence effect of trade created by the cross-border infrastructure development may not 
be intentionally created, but they exist nonetheless.   
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